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Abstract
Background: In 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared two "public health emergencies of
international concern", in response to the worldwide polio situation and the Ebola epidemic in West Africa
respectively. Both emergencies can be seen as testing moments, challenging the current model of epidemic
governance, where two worldviews co-exist: global health security and humanitarian biomedicine.
Discussion: The resurgence of polio and the spread of Ebola in 2014 have not only exposed the weaknesses of
national health systems, but also the shortcomings of the current global health regime in dealing with transnational
epidemic threats. These shortcomings are of three sorts. Firstly, the global health regime is fragmented and dominated
by the domestic security priorities of industrialised nations. Secondly, the WHO has been constrained by constitutional
country allegiances, crippling reforms and the limited impact of the (2005) International Health Regulations (IHR)
framework. Thirdly, the securitization of infectious diseases and the militarization of humanitarian aid undermine the
establishment of credible public health surveillance networks and the capacity to control epidemic threats.
Summary: The securitization of communicable diseases has so far led foreign aid policies to sideline health systems. It
has also been the source of ongoing misperceptions over the aims of global health initiatives. With its strict allegiance
to Member States, the WHO mandate is problematic, particularly when it comes to controlling epidemic diseases. In
this context, humanitarian medical organizations are expected to palliate the absence of public health services in the
most destitute areas, particularly in conflict zones. The militarization of humanitarian aid itself threatens this fragile and
imperfect equilibrium. None of the reforms announced by the WHO in the wake of the 68th World Health Assembly
address these fundamental issues.
Keywords: Global health, World Health Organization, Polio eradication, Ebola, Security, Militarization, Epidemic
response, Humanitarian action, Disasters, International Health Regulations
Background
Drawing from international relations theory, the con-
cepts of international regime, hegemonic stability and
collective security have been used by scholars to analyze
trends in the governance of global health. Focusing on
epidemic diseases, Hoffman [1] defines the "global health
security regime" as "the implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures by which
international actors (including both states and civil society
organizations) aim to protect their constituencies from the
transmission of diseases from one area to another". Rather
than a mere description of the roles and responsibilities of
global health actors, this approach provides a better under-
standing of the complexity of epidemic governance. Fur-
thermore, Lakoff [2] opposes as distinct regimes "global
health security" and "humanitarian biomedicine" for their
different visions of global health priorities. In our view,
both global health security and humanitarian biomedicine
inevitably co-exist in a complex political landscape defining
the current "global health regime". Significantly, this regime
has been put to the test in two coincident epidemic events
of international dimensions, caused respectively by
poliovirus and ebolavirus. Twice in 2014 (on May 5th
and August 8th respectively) Dr. Margaret Chan, Director
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General of the World Health Organization (WHO), de-
clared a public health emergency of international concern
after consultation with an Emergency Committee of ex-
perts convened under the provisions of the revised (2005)
International Health Regulations (IHR) [3]. Made in re-
sponse to increasing alarms over the international spread
of wild-type poliovirus, the first declaration was the latest
sign that the success of polio eradication was still uncer-
tain. The second announcement was a belated recognition
that the Ebola epidemic in West Africa was unprece-
dented in magnitude and international spread.
According to Hoffman [1], the current global health re-
gime has so far been characterised by expectations of inter-
national cooperation under the "hegemony" of the World
Health Organization. It is being challenged by the limita-
tions of the revised IHR (2005), the proliferation of global
health security organizations, new instruments of foreign
policy and new threats to health security. The IHR (2005)
stand out as innovative among other health treaties. They
oblige State Parties to notify defined public health threats
and to limit unnecessary public health measures [4]. Yet,
the temporary or standing recommendations issued by the
WHO are not binding for State Parties, making the IHR
(2005) weak instruments for outbreak response.
The mistrust of populations when public health actions
are disconnected from local perspectives has been seen in
recent circumstances, for example, the ongoing resistance
to polio vaccination in Pakistan and the hostility of some
communities towards measures to control Ebola in West
Africa. Elsewhere, coincident political violence and civil
wars are operational obstacles to polio eradication and
other public health initiatives, which appear in a new
geopolitical context, where public health is no longer
seen as politically neutral. This is the case, for example,
of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. The current global
health regime is poorly fit to meet such challenges, for at
least three reasons, which we will further examine: (i) the
encroachment of security policies on communicable dis-
eases in general, and public health surveillance in particu-
lar, (ii) the constraining mandates of United Nations (UN)
institutions, and (iii) the interference of security agendas
with humanitarian action.
Discussion
Smallpox and polio eradication: different political epochs
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative launched in 1988
has been a remarkable endeavour prompted by the pre-
cedent of smallpox eradication. A public-private partner-
ship endowed with considerable funding from private
philanthropy, the initiative followed expected tracks until
the early 2000s. This initial success led to the elimination of
serotype 2 poliovirus in 1999, to the possible elimination of
serotype 3 since November 2012 [5], and to wild-type sero-
type 1 remaining endemic in only three countries (Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Nigeria) since 2012. Unfortunately, vaccin-
ation campaigns continue to be rejected by some commu-
nities and their traditional leaders in specific regions of
overt or latent unrest. In northern Nigeria for example,
religious leaders and authorities concerned about the
safety of vaccines [6] and by the precedent of the Trovan
drug trial [7] boycotted polio immunization in 2003–2004,
resulting in the spread of polio to 20 countries [8]. In 2013,
wild poliovirus spread from Nigeria to Cameroon and
Somalia, while strains from Pakistan reached Iraq, Syria,
Israel and Afghanistan [9]. In 2015, the propagation of polio
seems to be halted in Iraq and Syria, but the situation
in Pakistan and Afghanistan remains a major public health
concern [10].
Non-binding temporary recommendations issued under
the IHR (2005) are unlikely to solve the fundamental prob-
lems of "the last mile" of the Global Polio Eradication Ini-
tiative, which are not essentially technical, programmatic or
even financial. More fundamentally, threats to the success
of the Initiative are rooted in socio-cultural and political is-
sues undermining confidence in vaccination programs [11].
When considering the final stages of the smallpox eradica-
tion campaign, it is barely surprising that social and cultural
clashes could compromise the completion of a worldwide
eradication campaign. In the 1970s, resistance to vac-
cination teams in India and Bangladesh was witnessed
by Euro-American epidemiologists, who ultimately resorted
to coercing villagers and intimidating local health care staff
to achieve universal coverage [12]. What is new nowadays
is the fact that polio remains endemic in zones of civil con-
flicts, where health care services are seen as symbols of for-
eign agendas [13]. Ongoing political violence exposes teams
of polio vaccinators to being deliberately targeted by local
insurgents, notably in northwestern Pakistan [14]. Ac-
cordingly, WHO country plans for Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Nigeria have been adjusted to include more compre-
hensive public health strategies, security components and
new communication tactics [15]. Ultimately, misinforma-
tion by obscurantist leaders or intimidation by extremist
militants are only partial explanations for the local rejec-
tion of polio vaccination campaigns [16]. A more fun-
damental problem is that the global health regime is
currently defined by security policies, which compromise
the credibility of important public health initiatives of inter-
national dimensions.
Securitization of infectious diseases
As a result of a prevailing focus on domestic security
among industrialized countries, and in particular since
the events in the USA on 9/11/2001, there has been a
significant impact on the way global public health ini-
tiatives have been conceived.
Security interests in health became prominent in the
1990s with the recognition that communicable diseases
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(HIV/AIDS in particular) have far-reaching impact on
trade and foreign affairs, beyond the strict realm of public
health. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
1308, concerned with the impact of HIV/AIDS on peace-
keeping operations in Africa [17]. Following new concerns
over bioterrorism, epidemic preparedness and response
also became “securitized”, i.e. framed in terms of do-
mestic and international security [18]. When applied to
public health, the word “security” therefore carries a fun-
damental ambiguity about the exact values at stake [19].
Health security can either be understood in terms of pro-
tection of health, protection of trade and economy or as a
matter of non-proliferation of biological weapons and
counter-terrorism. This ambiguity has far reaching con-
sequences, especially in the case of global public health
surveillance.
Box 1: glossary
Global public health surveillance is an essential activity
promoted under the IHR (2005) agenda [23], as well as one
of the pillars of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. After
2001, the security community became increasingly associ-
ated with the development of global public health sur-
veillance, recognizing that early outbreak detection could
identify or mitigate both natural and deliberate epidemic
threats. From the beginning of the revision process of the
IHR, this "dual use" argument has been a source of con-
troversy. Whether the scope of the IHR (2005) includes
the investigation of man-made outbreaks and conse-
quently non-proliferation issues, is still open to inter-
pretation. In practice the securitization of global public
health surveillance is now pervasive and can be illustrated
in a number of programmes deployed under private, na-
tional, international or supra-national initiatives (Table 1
and Additional file 1). Far from protecting global pub-
lic health from securitization, the WHO Secretariat –
through its partnerships and policies – has implicitly
added support to the view that public health surveil-
lance is primarily an instrument of national security instead
of a foundation for outbreak prevention and control [24].
For example, Article VII 39 in the final document of the
7th review conference of the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion (BWC) makes it clear that the IHR (2005) are instru-
mental to building surveillance and detection capacities
pertaining to the BWC [25]. In this example, where the
WHO is expected to provide the technical capacity to in-
vestigate suspicious outbreaks, securitization is counter-
productive to public health goals [26]. The blurring of lines
between security, disarmament and public health surveil-
lance also appears in new surveillance networks sponsored
by non-proliferation lobbies, in dual use technologies or in
multilateral alliances (Table 1). Securitization underpins a
subtle change of vocabulary, from the IHR (2005) "public
health surveillance" [23] to "biosurveillance" [20]. The latter
terminology not only reflects the increasing reliance on in-
formal “event-based surveillance” [22] systems for outbreak
detection, but also a shift from public health to domestic
security concerns [21], [27]. For example, in 2004, the US
National Biosurveillance Integration System was assigned
to the Department of Homeland Security [28], while in
2008 the Biosurveillance Coordination Unit was estab-
lished under the US CDC’s Coordination Office for
Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COT-
PER) [29]. The proliferation of national and global biosur-
veillance initiatives has created a new industry that brings
together public health institutions, academia, private se-
curity companies and the intelligence community. Coun-
ter to the argument that the goals of public health and
national security converge over matters of epidemic con-
trol, security agendas actually prevail over public health
achievements in the new health security doctrine. The
fake vaccination campaign organised by the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help track Osama bin Laden
showed how domestic security priorities can compromise
trust in public health initiatives. In May 2011, a Pakistani
doctor hired by the CIA conducted a hepatitis B vaccin-
ation campaign and allegedly managed to collect DNA
samples from vaccinated children to confirm the presence
Biological Weapons Convention – a multilateral disarmament treaty
prohibiting the development, production or stockpiling of bacteriological
and toxin weapons.
Biosurveillance – " …the process of active data-gathering with appropriate
analysis and interpretation of biosphere data that might relate to disease
activity and threats to human or animal health – whether infectious, toxic,
metabolic, or otherwise, and regardless of intentional or natural origin – in
order to achieve early warning of health threats, early detection of health
events, and overall situational awareness of disease activity" [20]. In contrast
to public health surveillance, one explicit purpose of biosurveillance is
to contribute to domestic security and measures to counter terrorist
threats [21].
Dual use – the use of programmes or technologies for both civilian and
military purposes.
Event-based surveillance – "…the organised collection, monitoring,
assessment and interpretation of mainly unstructured ad hoc information
regarding health events or risks, which may represent an acute risk to
human health" [22].
International Health Regulations (2005) – A binding set of international
regulations that requires States Parties to establish a credible national
surveillance and response capacity and to notify a potentially wide range of
events to the WHO on the basis of defined criteria indicating that the event
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern [23].
Public health surveillance – "The systematic ongoing collection, collation
and analysis of data for public health purposes and the timely dissemination
of public health information for assessment and public health response as
necessary" [23].
Securitization – framing the theory and the practice of a discipline
(e.g. public health) as a matter of national security.
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of the Bin Laden family in their compound in the town of
Abbottabad. The plot was clearly condemned by prom-
inent international experts as damaging the trust in the
polio eradication campaign and compromising its final
success [30, 31].
The paradox of UN mandates in civil conflict zones
The case of Syria is illustrative of the limitations imposed
by UN mandates on the capacity of the WHO to ensure
adequate public health responses in areas of civil conflicts
[32]. UN agencies and the WHO in particular have been
perceived taking sides with the Assad regime and disre-
garding the health needs of part of the Syrian population
[33]. Polio vaccination activities have been very much at
stake in this controversy. The Syrian Republic had not
seen a case of polio since 1999. While polio probably reap-
peared as early as May 2013 in Deir al-Zour Province [34],
an outbreak of acute flaccid paralysis was only confirmed
as polio by Syrian authorities in October 2013. A contro-
versy arose when the Syrian Government and the WHO
country office were accused of delaying the confirmation
of cases in areas sympathetic to the opposition [35, 36].
The outbreak seems to have been curbed in 2015, al-
though the reliability of surveillance data is still disputed
[34, 37]. Members of the new Islamic State insurgency
support polio vaccination efforts [38], but it is doubtful if
UN agencies alone can gain operational access and trust
from all parties in conflicts. UN mandates and governance
are indeed poorly adjusted to the fact that civil conflicts
and public health crises are nowadays inevitably inter-
twined. The WHO is constitutionally constrained by its al-
legiance to Member States and cannot officially recognize
opposition parties as operational partners. This is a
problem in terms of neutrality, independence, legitim-
acy and access in situations of civil war. In contrast,
some international humanitarian organizations have for-
mal or informal legitimacy to operate regardless of polit-
ical fractures and state funding. They cannot substitute for
UN agencies, but their unequivocal neutrality and imparti-
ality are assets to secure universal access to conflict zones
and to remain credible. This is why the co-optation of hu-
manitarian aid as an instrument of domestic security puts
both humanitarian action and global public health initia-
tives in jeopardy.
Interference of security agendas with humanitarian action
The setbacks of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in
its final stage could have been anticipated precisely in
those conflict zones where access and trust are para-
mount. However, new counter-terrorism and foreign
policies of Western coalitions are enmeshing humani-
tarian action into international security agendas, which
can discredit the neutrality of all humanitarian actors,
for example when relief and health care are provided to
secure the acceptance of counter-insurgency operations
[39, 40]. The securitization of global public health and
the militarization of humanitarian action reflect the dom-
inance of post-9/11 doctrines in the global health regime,
and both trends combine to compromise the success of
the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. This political com-
plexity is not acknowledged by the WHO. In her opening
statement at the 67th World Health Assembly, Dr. Chan
attributed the recent downturn of international polio
control to: “Armed conflict that flies in the face of inter-
national humanitarian law. Civil unrest. Migrant popu-
lations. Weak border controls. Poor routine immunization
coverage. Bans on vaccination by militant groups. And the
targeted killing of polio workers” [41]. Ironically, just
ahead of that opening session, the CIA implicitly ac-
knowledged some responsibility by announcing that the
Table 1 Examples of securitization of global public health surveillance: typology
Governance level Securitizing agent Initiatives or projects Examplesa
Private Private philanthropy Sponsoring the establishment
of global surveillance networks
1. Nuclear Threat Initiative
National USA (Security agencies, academia) Development of event-based
surveillance technology
2. Project Argus
USA (Senate) Capacity building, conditional
aid to developing countries
3. US Global Pathogen Surveillance Act (2007)
International USA (President) Political and technical alliance 4. Global Health Security Agenda
Some industrialised countries Political alliance 5. Global Health Security Initiative
Regional surveillance networks Coordination of regional
surveillance networks
6. CORDS
Supra-national WHO Technical resources for event verification 7. Biological Weapons Convention
WHO/UNODA Technical support to the UN
Secretary-General
8. Memorandum of understanding
aNumbered examples and additional references are summarised in Additional File 1
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agency was ending the use of vaccination programmes
in its spying operations [42].
Global health governance after the Ebola epidemic
A consensus has emerged to say that the disastrous situ-
ation in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone reflects the dis-
array of national health systems and a vacuum in global
health governance [43, 44]. With a much delayed and frag-
mented regional response, the case is an archetype of the
global health security regime in several respects. What
ultimately triggered the international mobilisation of
adequate resources was the realisation that the epidemic
could easily spread out of Africa and represented a com-
mon threat to international peace and security. In Septem-
ber 2014, three major political decisions followed this
reasoning. Firstly, the UN Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 2177, acknowledging that the Ebola outbreak in
Western Africa constituted a threat to international peace
and security. Secondly, the US administration deployed
some 3,000 military personnel in Liberia to reinforce
outbreak-control measures. Although such an initiative
was generally acclaimed as a valuable contribution to
controlling a catastrophic situation, some scholars see
it as yet another example of the militarization of hu-
manitarian aid [45, 46]. Thirdly, a UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response (UNMEER) was established in Ghana.
Its regional mandate and authority are limited, but as the
first UN emergency health mission, UNMEER might be-
come a precedent for a new transnational outbreak govern-
ance system, thus marginalising the IHR (2005) framework
of non-binding recommendations.
It is uncertain how the current global health security
regime will evolve [1], particularly after the epidemic cri-
ses of 2014–2015. Notwithstanding an evaluation of the
performance of the IHR (2005), the ‘reforms’ proposed
by the WHO [47, 48] in the wake of the 68th World
Health Assembly consist in: (i) integrating WHO out-
break and emergency response units, (ii) the creation of
a global health-emergency workforce, (iii) setting up an
emergency contingency fund, and (iv) advancing the re-
search and development of medical products for infectious
diseases of epidemic potential, and (v) strengthening health
systems. One could muse over the fact that such measures
are belated, obvious or simply represent an attempt to res-
urrect similar assets dismantled by a recent round of crip-
pling reforms. More than with circumstantial resolutions,
global health would be served by genuine reforms of the
current regime, emphasizing universal health values in-
stead of security and diplomacy interests. This would entail
a new constitutional mandate for the WHO. Reflecting on
the future of global health governance, Lawrence Gostin
has called for a new Framework Convention on Global
Health [49]. With a bold departure from the UN gov-
ernance model, a new and more credible global health
regime could be built upon such a convention, by trans-
cending narrow State interests. The core of this new
architecture would make the WHO akin to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross with its supra-
national mandate, with political independence and a
better capacity to react to global health crises.
Summary
The setbacks of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
and the delayed control of the Ebola epidemic in West
Africa reflect a fragmented approach to outbreak pre-
paredness. More broadly, they point to profound flaws
in the current regime of global health governance, which
is guided by foreign affairs and security policies. The
securitization of communicable diseases has so far led for-
eign aid policies to sideline health systems. It has also been
the source of ongoing misperceptions over the aims of
global health initiatives. With its strict allegiance to
Member States, the WHO mandate is problematic, par-
ticularly when it comes to controlling epidemic diseases.
In this context, humanitarian medical organizations are
expected to palliate the absence of public health services
in the most destitute areas, particularly in conflict zones.
The militarization of humanitarian aid itself threatens this
fragile and imperfect equilibrium. None of the reforms
announced by the WHO in the wake of the 68th World
Health Assembly address these fundamental issues.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Examples of securitization of global public health
surveillance: overview of selected initiatives or projects. (DOC 50 kb)
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